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ILLINOIS ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
Valerie Swett*
In 1973 the Illinois Supreme Court adopted new disciplinary
procedures for attorneys charged with unethical conduct. This
Article explores this new system, comparing it to criminal proce-
dures. The author suggests that the significant similarities be-
tween the two models may justify adoption of criminal safe-
guards in attorney discipline proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted new procedures
for supervising attorney discipline' which closely correspond with
recommendations set forth by the American Bar Association.'
Although attorney discipline traditionally has been considered
civil in nature,3 these new procedures have some significant
similarities to the criminal justice system. The supreme court did
not, however, fully adopt a criminal law model. This Article will
analyze the operation of these new procedures, their similarity to
criminal procedures, and the potential improvement of the attor-
ney discipline system by adopting a criminal procedure rationale.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF THE
BAR
Illinois, like a number of states,4 treats attorney discipline as
* Associate, Kaplan and Cummings; B.A., 1973 University of Rochester; J.D., 1976
Northwestern University; The author wishes to express her gratitude to: Joyce Hughes,
Associate Professor, Northwestern University Law School; Kathleen Crowley, J.D.,
Northwestern University; and Mary Conrad, Counsel of the Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary System of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
1. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 751-70.
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrEE, AN EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY EN-
FORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT XVI (1970)
[hereinafter cited as CLARK COMMISSION REPORT].
3. See In re Melin, 410 Ill. 332, 102 N.E.2d 119 (1952); In re Needham, 364 I11. 65, 4
N.E.2d 19 (1936). Disciplinary proceedings were not considered criminal prosecutions. In
re Cohn, 10 Ill.2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1957); In re Hamilton, 388 Ill. 589, 58 N.E.2d 449
(1945).
4. In an informal interview, James Bradner, Assistant Director of the American Bar
Association Center for Professional Discipline, 1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637,
indicated that attorney discipline is controlled independently by the judiciary in some 13
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an exclusively judicial function.' The rationale behind this atti-
tude is that lawyers are considered officers of the court and,
hence, the judiciary is responsible for supervising attorneys' ac-
tions.' The United States Supreme Court also has recognized this
theory in the regulation of the federal bar.7 Because the state and
federal judiciaries are the independent creatures of their re-
spective constitutions,' each has independent jurisdiction in
controlling its respective bar. As a result, state and federal cri-
teria and procedures for admission to practice and disbarment are
not dependent on each other, except insofar as the courts exercise
discretion in favor of interdependence.? However, there are a few
federal limitations on state judicial discretion to regulate the
legal community.
One procedure limiting states in regulating the practice of law
is a Supreme Court review of state proceedings before disbarring
an attorney from federal practice based on a state disbarment.
The Court has held that state disbarment would not result in
Supreme Court disbarment if 1) the state proceeding denied due
process because it lacked notice or hearing, 2) the factual findings
were of insufficient strength to justify reliance, or 3) following the
state ruling would conflict with a sense of "right and justice."' 0
A second limitation on state regulation of the bar is the appli-
states. In the remaining states, it is controlled either by the unified or local bar
associations.
5. See In re Wyatt, 53 lll.2d 44, 289 N.E.2d 630 (1972); People ex ret. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937); People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank,
344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); In re Day, 181 11. 73, 54 N.E.2d 646 (1899). For a
discussion of attorney discipline as the exclusive province of the courts in other jurisdic-
tions, see CLARK COMMISSION REPORT at 10-18.
6. See In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E.2d 646 (1899). The Illinois Supreme Court over-
turned a state statute setting criteria for the admission of attorneys to practice. The court
examined the nature of judicial power reserved to the courts by the state constitution's
separation of powers clause. It pointed out that in England, admission to the bar had been
controlled by the courts whereas disbarment was a parliamentary function. The court
observed that in this country, control over both the admission and disbarment functions
has been considered judicial. The court reasoned that judicial authority over both func-
tions arises logically from the attorney's role as an officer of the court and from the judicial
responsibility to maintain and supervise the courts.
7. See Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1869); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 333 (1867); Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9 (1856).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. 11, §§1, 2; U.S. CONST. art. IV; Theard v. United States, 354
U.S. 278, 281 (1957).
9. 28 U.S.C. app. (1970); U.S. SuP. CT. R. 5.
10. Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 57 (1917).
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cation of First Amendment rights of free speech and association
to the admission and disbarment procedures. The first two cases
dealing with First Amendment rights in attorney licensing proce-
dures were Konigsberg v. State Bar of California" and Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico. ' Applicants, in both
cases, were denied admission to practice because, due to possible
communist affiliation, they were unable to establish that they
were of good moral character. 3 In each of these cases the Supreme
Court found that the state authority was used arbitrarily and
violated rights of political belief and association. 4
Though it appeared that Konigsberg and Schware indicated
that the state could not require, as a condition to membership in
the state bar, responses to questions related to political beliefs,,'
11. 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
12. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
13. Both decisions assessed the evidence used to deny an applicant admission to the
bar in order to determine whether the inferences drawn satisfied due process by bearing a
rational relationship to the applicant's fitness to practice law. Id. at 238-39; Konigsberg
v. State Bar of Calif., 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Konigsberg involved an applicant to the bar
in California. After he passed the bar exam and satisfied all other technical conditions
for admission, the State Committee of Bar Examiners denied him admission on the
grounds that he had failed to prove that he was of good moral character and did not
advocate violent overthrow of the government. 353 U.S. at 253. Konigsberg presented
character evidence in the form of testimony by friends and associates and information
about his background. The evidence against him was the testimony of an ex-Communist
who had seen him at party meetings more than ten years before and a series of editorials
he had written which were critical of some public officials and policies, and his refusal
throughout the fitness hearings to answer questions relating to his political beliefs and
associations on the grounds that the questions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 266.
The applicant in Schware technically was qualified for admission to the bar except that
the New Mexico Board of Bar Examiners found that he lacked the moral character to be
admitted. This conclusion was based on the fact that the applicant had used aliases on
several occasions, had been arrested twice, and had been a member of the Communist
party. All of these events occurred almost fifteen years prior to Schware's application to
the bar, and he presented the bar examiners with considerable evidence of good character
and standing in the community. 353 U.S. at 235-38.
14. 353 U.S. at 240-47. The Supreme Court held that the board was not justified in
inferring a lack of moral character from the use of aliases, which Schware had adopted to
avoid anti-Semitic prejudice from fellow employees; from the arrests, which had resulted
from political and union activities and had not led to convictions; or from his membership
in the Communist party, which did not necessarily require advocacy of illegal or immoral
activities. The Supreme Court found that the state bar examiners' reliance on the evi-
dence to deny Konigsberg admission to the bar was an arbitrary exercise of their authority
violating his freedom of political belief and association. Therefore the Court returned the
application to the bar examiners for reconsideration. 353 U.S. at 273-74.
15. For instance, in Konigsberg, the Court indicated that membership in the Commun-
ist party was insufficient as a sole ground for denying admission to the bar. 353 U.S. at
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this impression was negated in In re Anastaplo. 16 The Illinois
Committee on Character and Fitness refused to certify Anastaplo
for admission to practice because, by failing to answer questions
about membership in the Communist Party, he had obstructed
the committee's investigation. The committee had no extrinsic
evidence upon which to base its suspicion about Anastaplo's pol-
itical affiliations. 7 Nevertheless, the Court held that this did not
alter the validity of examining the applicant's political associa-
tions since the state interest in ascertaining an applicant's atti-
tude toward the nation's political institutions exists regardless of
the availability of extrinsic evidence on the issue."
The Supreme Court's focus" shifted back to First Amendment
rights in 1971 when it decided Application of Stolar.2 ° Stolar was
253 (1957). In addition, the Court stated:
We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their own bars, but
it is equally important that the State not exercise this power in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner nor in such a way as to impinge on the freedom of
political expression or association. . . . It is also important both to society and
the bar itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak and act as
members of an Independent Bar.
Id.
16. 366 U.S. 82 (1961). Accord, Konigsberg, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). In reviewing the Califor-
nia bar examiners' second denial of admission to Konigsberg, the Court held questions
relating to membership in the Communist party to be relevant to the committee's investi-
gation and cross-examination of the applicant's veracity in responses to general questions
about violent overthrow of the government. 366 U.S. at 44-49. Konigsberg's refusal to
answer was not privileged because the Court considered it necessary to limit First Amend-
ment freedoms in situations where the informed exercise of the state power to license
requires disclosure. The Court held that in attorney licensure the state's interest in ascer-
taining the applicant's attitude toward the political and legal system within which he
must work justifies a requirement that political beliefs and associations be disclosed. 366
U.S. at 49-56.
17. 366 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1961).
18. Since the record indicated that Anastaplo had received adequate warning of the
consequences of his refusal to answer and that no arbitrary state action had been shown,
the denial of admission was affirmed. Id. at 90-97.
19. The Court's shift in analysis of the permissibility of questions about applicants'
political associations and beliefs reflected a shift in focus. In the 1957 Schware and
Konigsberg decisions the Court focused on the impact forced response to questions about
political associations and beliefs would have on the applicant's First Amendment rights.
See notes 11-15 supra. The 1961 Konigsberg and In re Anastaplo decisions, on the other
hand, gave priority to the state's interest in obtaining all relevant information about an
applicant even though some limitation of First Amendment rights could result. See notes
16-18 supra.
20. 401 U.S. 23 (1971). See also Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971). In
applying for admission to the Arizona Bar, Baird satisfied all formal requirements, includ-
ing disclosure of all organizations to which she had belonged since age sixteen, except that
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a member in good standing of the New York bar who sought
admission to practice in Ohio. He answered all of the Ohio bar
admissions committee's questions except one asking if he be-
longed to any organizations advocating the violent overthrow of
the government and two asking for the names and addresses of
organizations to which he had belonged."' The Supreme Court's
plurality opinion ruled that the responses to those questions were
privileged under the First Amendment because conditioning
admission to the bar on them would have a chilling effect on an
applicant's freedom of association." In the Court's estimation,
the investigation of an applicant's qualifications to practice law
was served adequately by Stolar's responses to other questions
giving the committee detailed biographical information, indicat-
ing that he subscribed to the ABA Canons of Ethics, and stating
that he was loyal to the American government.23
In addition to applying the First Amendment, the Supreme
Court also examines state regulation of the bar by other constitu-
tional criteria. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that due
process safeguards, notice of charges and a hearing, be afforded
she refused to answer a question asking if she had ever been a member of the Communist
party or of any organization advocating the violent overthrow of the government. Her
refusal to answer the question was the basis upon which she was denied admission to the
bar. 401 U.S. at 4-5. The Supreme Court reasoned that Baird's disclosure of prior associa-
tions was sufficient for the committee to ascertain her fitness to practice law so that the
sole purpose the question she refused to answer could serve was determination of her
political beliefs. From this the Court concluded that the Arizona procedure contemplated
denial of admission to the bar on the basis of an applicant's political beliefs or associa-
tions. It held that the First Amendment prohibits denial of admission on these grounds
because it penalizes the mere possession of political views.
21. 401 U.S. at 25-27.
22. Id. at 30.
23. Id. at 30-31. Thus, the Court shifted back to giving First Amendment rights priority
over the state interest in investigating an applicant's political beliefs without much ex-
planation. Rather than reconcile the 1961 decisions with the 1957 and 1971 decisions, the
Court merely pointed out that the issue of First Amendment rights in state bar admissions
proceedings had been a source of conflict for the Court. Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,
401 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23, 24-25 (1971). In 1971 the Court indicated
an intent to clarify the state of the law on this issue. Thus, the tension between First
Amendment rights and the state investigatory power apparently has been resolved in favor
of the First Amendment. 401 U.S. at 3-4. For further discussion of the shifts in the Court's
focus and the reasons therefore, see Note, Constitutional Law-Bar Admission Proce-
dures: Inquiry into Political Beliefs and Associations, 22 DEPAUL L. REV. 524 (1972); Note,
Constitutional Law-Bar Admissions-New Standards for Inquiry into Applicants' Asso-
ciations and Beliefs, 50 N.C. L. REV. 360 (1972); 85 HARv. L. REv. 212 (1971).
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to those denied admission24 and to those undergoing disbarment
proceedings.25 Also, the assertion of the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege by an attorney facing a criminal penalty
is not grounds for disbarment."6 Disciplinary action is inappro-
priate for claiming specific constitutional rights.27
III. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
Because constitutional limitations on state regulation of its bar
are minimal, states have great flexibility in creating procedures
and forums through which to impose attorney discipline. Par-
tially as a result of this flexibility, the structures used in the
different states vary broadly, ranging from disciplinary proceed-
ings initiated and carried out solely by the local bar associations"
to a centralized structure run by an independent commission.2"
24. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
25. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968).
26. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6
(1964).
27. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. at 514-16. There remain many questions relating to
application and scope of these constitutional principles. For instance, it is not clear from
the facts of Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967), whether the decision merely prohibits
disbarment for assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination when the penalty
risked is criminal prosecution or whether the privilege also exists where the only penalty
risked is disbarment. A corollary to this is the question of whether a grant of immunity
protects against criminal prosecution only or against both prosecution and professional
disciplinary proceedings. The Spevack Court expressly refused to deal with the question
of whether the privilege extends to an attorney's records as well as his testimony. Attor-
ney's records may be outside the scope of the privilege if they are considered to be in the
nature of public records. Another issue which the Supreme Court has not met is whether
the interests at stake in disbarment proceedings are of the magnitude involved in criminal
trials, making the due process rights of a criminal defendant available to the responding
attorney.
For a discussion of the scope of Spevack see Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immun-
ity and Comment in Bar Disciplinary Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. REV. 84, 88 (1973); Franck,
The Myth of Spevack v. Klein, 54 A.B.A.J. 970 (1968). For a discussion of federal limita-
tions on state bar proceedings see Chilingirian, State Disbarment Proceedings and Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 BuFF. L. REv. 489, 496-98 (1968).
28. For example, in New Jersey, attorney discipline is not controlled by any central
entity. A lack of centralized information in the ethics area makes an exhaustive listing
impossible without a state-by-state search. The American Bar Association Center for
Professional Discipline, 1155 E. 60th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637, is working on a na-
tional compilation of such information.
29. The Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary System is an example of such a
structure. States which have a structure similar to Illinois' are Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN.
title 25 (1947); Colorado, CoLO. REV. STAT. title 12, art. 5 (1973); Delaware, DEL. LAW
CANONS DR 1-9 (1975); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. ch. 605 (1968); Indiana, IND. STAT. ANN.
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Illinois has created the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disci-
plinary System (ARDS),30 which first became effective in 1973,
and which closely resembles the American Bar Association's
model.3' As such, study of the Illinois system should make appar-
ent the strengths and weaknesses not only of the Illinois system
but also of the Clark Commission's guidelines.
Attorney discipline in Illinois is supervised by the Illinois Su-
preme Court.2 Practical considerations, however, have required
that the court appoint an outside body, ARDS, to screen com-
plaints and gather evidence. This type of judicial authority dele-
gation, though challenged several times, consistently has been
held constitutional.33 The court in In re Czachorski4 explained
that it does not delegate judicial power but rather appoints agents
of the court whose findings and recommendations are reviewed by
the court before it renders a decision.
The disciplinary proceedings conducted by the court's commis-
sioners are considered to be judicial in character,35 yet are neither
criminal nor civil in nature.3 As such, the proceedings are con-
ducted in a manner similar to other judicial trials of fact and yet
are unique to the disbarment proceedings. While some of the
formalities of a trial such as the law of evidence37 and notice
Court Rule A.D. 23 (Bums 1973); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 221, §§37-52
(1958); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ch. 18 (1953); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. title 17, ch.
14 (1962); and Rhode Island, GEN. LAWS OF R.I. ch. 27, §11 (1956).
30. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 751-70.
31. The similarity is apparent from a comparison of the diagramatic representation of
the Clark Commission model with the structure of the ARDS. The reader may find it of
interest to compare the Clark Commission's model with ARDS. See notes 63-100 and
accompanying text infra.
The similarity is also apparent from a comparison of the 36 recommendations made by
the Clark Commission, CLARK COMMISSION REPORT 19-191, with the rules and regulations
governing the ARDS.
32. In re Sherman, 60 Ill.2d 590. 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975).
33. In re Donaghy,,402 Ill. 120, 83 N.E.2d 560 (1949); In re McCallum, 391 Ill. 400, 418,
64 N.E.2d 310, 317 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 689 (1945).
34. 41 l.2d 549, 554, 244 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1969); accord, In re Donaghy, 393 Ill. 621,
623, 66 N.E.2d 856, 857 (1946); In re McCallum, 391 Ill. 400, 418, 64 N.E.2d 310, 317
(1945).
35. In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 324, 52 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1944).
36. In re Czachorski, 41 Ill.2d 549, 554, 244 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1969); In re Damisch, 38
ll.2d 195, 206, 230 N.E.2d 254, 260 (1967); In re Yablunky, 407 Ill. 111, 120, 94 N.E.2d
841, 846 (1950). See also Murphy, A Short History of Disciplinary Procedures in Illinois,
60 Ill. B.J. 528, 532 (1972).
37. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Amos, 264 I1. 299, 302, 92 N.E. 857, 859 (1910).
The taking of evidence on disciplinary charges is governed by the common law rules of
19771
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requirements38 are followed, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
that the procedures are to be applied more flexibly than in a civil
or criminal trial, making technical objections to evidence of no
avail39 or strict adherance to rules of pleading unnecessary.'"
For example, the ARDS prosecutor must present clear and con-
vincing proof." This burden of proof is the same whether or not
the conduct charged also alleges a crime.2 In addition to normal
methods of rebutting the allegations of the complaint, the re-
sponding attorney can present evidence of his personal character
and circumstances. 3 At most, however, this evidence may be
used to raise an inference against discipline if the evidence on the
merits of the charge is uncertain." At the least, it is considered
evidence. In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 324, 52 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1944); People v. Amos, 246
Ill. 299, 302, 92 N.E. 857, 859 (1910). The stringency with which the rules of evidence are
applied has been observed to be higher when a jury hears the disciplinary proceeding.
Comment, Evidence-Rules of Evidence in Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, and Grand Jury
Proceedings, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1218, 1219-20 (1960). This pattern is well-founded in the
historical purpose for which the rules were developed: to prevent unskilled juries from
reaching conclusions based on unreliable or false evidence. Forkosch, The Nature of Legal
Evidence, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 1356, 1360 (1971). Forkosch points out that the passing of the
uneducated, unsophisticated jury may call into question the bulk of the evidentiary rules
as we know them. Id. at 1380-81. Most cases indicate that when there is a difference
between the rules applicable to criminal or civil proceedings the civil rule is used in an
attorney disciplinary proceeding. In re Malmin, 364 Il. 164, 4 N.E.2d 111 (1936) (rule
stated generally); In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936) (rule stated generally);
People ex rel. Lucey v. Stonecipher, 271 Il. 506, 111 N.E. 496 (1916) (responding attorney
does not have criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses). There is at least one case,
however, where the criminal rule was chosen. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Bither,
334 Ill. 264, 165 N.E. 798 (1929) (confession of a co-conspirator held inadmissable because
it was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy. If the civil rule had been applied, the
confession would have been admissible.)
38. ARDC RULES 2.2, 4.4, 10.6.
39. In re Damisch, 38 Ill.2d 195, 203, 230 N.E.2d 254, 259 (1967).
40. In re Czachorski, 41 [ll.2d 549, 554, 244 N.E.2d 164, 167 (1969); In re Yablunky,
407 I1. 111, 120, 94 N.E.2d 841, 846 (1950).
41. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c).
42. The early cases demonstrate uncertainty about the possibility of applying a beyond
a reasonable doubt standard. In re Harris, 383 I1. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441 (1943) (criminal
charge, beyond reasonable doubt burden of proof); In re Malmin, 364 111. 164, 4 N.E.2d
111 (1936) (criminal charge, clear and convincing burden of proof); People ex rel. Chicago
Bar Ass'n v. Bither, 334 IIl. 264, 165 N.E. 798 (1920) (criminal charge, beyond reasonable
doubt burden of proof); People ex rel. Cline v. Kerker, 315 Il. 572, 146 N.E. 439 (1925)
(criminal charge, beyond reasonable doubt burden of proof); People v. Ader, 263 111. 319,
104 N.E. 1060 (1914) (non-criminal charge, beyond reasonable doubt burden of proof).
43. See note 117 infra.
44. In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d 357, 389, 140 N.E.2d 825, 841 (1956).
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in mitigation when the board or court determines which disci-
pline to recommend or impose.
The substantive rules of Illinois attorney discipline are less
precise than in other areas of the law and have developed on a
case-by-case basis, creating a common law of ethics. The Su-
preme Court Rules focus primarily on the structure of the ARDS
rather than on the substantive bases for discipline." Also, though
charges are often based on the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity,4" the Code is merely a guideline for professional conduct"
which is not mandatorily applied nor adopted as a Supreme
Court Rule.4" Therefore, a complaint may charge either violations
of specific Code provisions' or conduct which violates only the
spirit of the Code."
Since there is no specific code of substantive rules for attorney
discipline, a wide variety of vague rules has been developed.
This problem is intensified by the Illinois Supreme Court's re-
fusal to utilize the doctrine of stare decisis5' strictly in discipli-
nary proceedings. A look at the case law, however, may provide
45. This is apparent from a perusal of the ARDS Rules. Little has been published on
the common law of ethics in Illinois. Note, An Illinois Disbarment Proceeding, 26 ILL. L.
REV. 457 (1932), collects a number of disciplinary decisions made prior to 1932 and appears
to be the most recent collection.
46. The American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted in
1970 by the Chicago Bar Association and by the Illinois State Bar Association in 1970. It
replaced the American Bar Association Canons of Ethics, which had been in effect for at
least 50 years. Pitts, The New Code of Professional Responsibility, 58 ILL. B.J. 323 (1970);
1970-71 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ISBA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 1971 ISBA BLUE BOOK 78 (bound with 59 ILL. B.J. (1971)). The binding
force and effect of the Code of Professional Responsibility varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, according to the manner of its adoption. Where adopted by rule of court, or
by the state legislature, the Code receives the force and effect of statute. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 27 (1953).
47. In re Krasner, 32 Ill.2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d
357, 386-87, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839-40 (1957); In re Moore, 8 Ill.2d 373, 378, 134 N.E.2d 324,
326 (1956); In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 324, 52 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1944).
48. In re Krasner, 32 Ill.2d 121, 129, 204 N.E.2d 10, 14 (1965); In re Heirich, 10 II.2d
357, 386-87, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839-40 (1957); In re Moore, 8 Ill.2d 373, 378, 134 N.E.2d 324,
326 (1956); In re Mitgang, 385 I1. 311, 324, 52 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1944).
49. An example of this is conversion of a client's funds which violates AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE 9-102 ("Preserving
Identity of Funds and Property of a Client").
50. Although there is no authority for this in the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 9-102, "Preserving Identity of Funds and
Property of a Client", is often used to bring this kind of action.
51. In re Nesselson, 35 Ill.2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966).
1977]
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valuable insight into the types of charges the court will hear. One
of the most common complaints is that an attorney has or is
engaged in an unprofessional course of dealing. This somewhat
superficial charge may allege a series of similar incidents of mis-
conduct, such as repeated solicitation of personal injury cases, 2
or allege a collection of dissimilar acts of misconduct which would
be unlikely to be brought as separate complaints.53 Since discipli-
nary charges are subject to no statute of limitations, the period
over which the alleged offenses occur theoretically could be of
indefinite length.5"
A disciplinary complaint also can charge that the attorney con-
ducted himself or herself in a manner which has the appearance
of impropriety.55 Because the misconduct alleged is the appear-
ance of impropriety, only the appearance of conduct breaching
professional duty, rather than actual breaches of duty, need be
shown.5" Although the Code of Professional Responsibility and
language of the Illinois Supreme Court imply that discipline
could be based on this type of charge alone, no case has been
found where this has occurred. The charge appears to be used as
a companion to charges of actual breach of professional duty.57
Another form of charge is the type based on or related to a
criminal charge. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
is grounds for disciplinary action against the convicted attorney."
52. In re Nesselson, 35 Ill.2d 454, 220 N.E.2d 409 (1966); In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d 357,
140 N.E.2d 825 (1957); In re Cohn, 10 Ill.2d 186, 139 N.E.2d 301 (1956); In re Veach, 1
Ill.2d 264, 115 N.E.2d 257 (1953); In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807 (1944). Other
examples of unprofessional course of dealing are In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 50 N.E.2d 441
(1943) (attorney scheme to extort large fees); cases involving misuse of clients' funds: In
re Czachorski, 41 Ill.2d 549, 244 N.E.2d 164 (1969); In re Royal, 29 Ill.2d 458, 194 N.E.2d
242 (1963); In re Power, 407 Ill. 525, 96 N.E.2d 460 (1950).
53. See, e.g., In re Lingle, 27 Ill.2d 459, 189 N.E.2d 342 (1963) (charges of commingling
clients' funds, failing to carry out a court order, delaying action on a suit, and failure to
return clients' records).
54. See In re Lingle, 27 Ill.2d 459, 189 N.E.2d 342 (1963) (five incidents charged took
place during an eighteen-month period). See also In re Power, 407 Ill. 525, 96 N.E.2d 460
(1950) (four incidents charged took place during a seven-year period).
55. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCIPLINARY RULE
9-101.
56. People v. Sherwin, 364 Ill. 350, 359, 4 N.E.2d 477, 480-81 (1936).
57. For instance, in People v. Sherwin, 364 Ill. 350, 358-59, 4 N.E.2d 477, 480-81 (1936)
the court censured the attorney for the appearance of impropriety only after deciding that
the alleged substantive misconduct had not been proved adequately.
58. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 761 (amend. 1975). This has been the rule throughout the history
of Illinois attorney discipline except for a brief departure between 1973 and 1975 when the
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The Illinois Supreme Court has defined "moral turpitude" to
mean "anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty, or
good morals."59 An acquittal of the criminal charge, however, is
not proof of innocence for disciplinary purposes because the bur-
dens of proof and standards for conduct applied in attorney disci-
pline are different from those applicable in criminal cases. 0
A final form of complaint is based on the failure of an attorney
to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation involving himself or
another attorney. An attorney has the duty to assist in an investi-
gation of his own professional conduct or that of another attor-
ney." This duty is limited only by the attorney's right to claim
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination."2
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE ATTORNEY REGISTRY AND DISCIPLINE
SYSTEM
The basic structure of the ARDS, which deals with complaints
such as these, is delineated by Illinois Supreme Court Rules 751-
70. The specific details of the system are determined by the
ARDS Rules, which are regulations promulgated by the ARDS
and the various boards within the system.63 The normal procedure
involves a three-level structure of boards, the Inquiry, Hearing,
and Review Boards, which hear cases before they are reviewed by
the Illinois Supreme Court, which retains ultimate authority over
attorney discipline. 4
The Illinois Supreme Court appoints an Attorney Registration
Supreme Court Rules listed a series of specific crimes upon which discipline would be
based: "(1) theft or any offense involving fraud, (2) forgery, (3) extortion, (4) bribery, (5)
perjury or (6) an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing..."
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 761 (1973). Examples of cases stating the rule are In re Bass, 49 Ill.2d
269, 274 N.E.2d 6 (1971); In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
59. In re Needham, 364 Ill. 65, 70, 4 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1936). Examples of crimes which
involve moral turpitude are mail fraud and income tax evasion. See In re Bass, 49 Ill.2d
292, 274 N.E.2d 6 (1971) (income tax evasion); In re Needham, 364 I1. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19
(1936).
60. In re Browning, 23 Ill.2d 489, 179 N.E.2d 14 (1961).
61. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 761.
62. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
63. The commission is authorized to create regulations by Illinois Supreme Court Rule
751(a). In those regulations the commission has authorized the boards to issue regulations
also, although to date the boards have not utilized this authority. ARDC RULES 2.5, 9.7,
10.7. Copies of the ARDC Rules may be obtained from the ARDS Administrator, 203 N.
Wabash, Chicago, Illinois 60601.
64. In re Sherman, 60 Ill.2d 590, 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975).
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and Disciplinary Commission, which consists of five volunteer
members of the bar, and an Administrator. "5 The duties of the
commission involve the management of financial and business
aspects of the ARDS and the establishment of policy for the sys-
tem." The Commission's central policy in administration of the
system is the expeditious handling of charges.67 The Administra-
tor's obligation is to seek discipline of attorneys"s whose conduct
tends "to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the
courts or the legal profession into disrepute."69 To be pursued by
the Administrator, a charge should be clear as to the attorney and
conduct in question, but the Administrator is given a great deal
of flexibility in assisting complainants.
Inquiry into possible ethical misconduct is carried out by the
Administrator7' through investigators. Investigatory tools include
the power to subpoena witnesses72 and to request written informa-
tion from the charged attorney or any other attorney in a position
to have knowledge of facts pertinent to a case.73 After investiga-
tion the Administrator may refer a complaint to an Inquiry
Board. Referral will be made if the Administrator believes that
the attorney "may have engaged" in prohibited conduct. If he
does not so believe, the Administrator may close a file only with
the concurrence of the Chairman of the Inquiry Board. If the
Chairman does not agree, the complaint must proceed to the full
Inquiry Board.7
The Inquiry Board decides on the basis of the evidence before
it whether a charge should be dismissed or a formal complaint
filed with a Hearing Board. Any such decision is subject to recon-
sideration by the same panel prior to the filing of a formal com-
65. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 751, 752.
66. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 751.
67. ARDC RULES PREAMBLE.
68. ARDC RULES 1.2.
69. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 752; ARDC RULES 1.1.
70. ARDC RULES 1.2.
71. ARDC RULES 1.1.
72. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 754.
73. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 769. There are two exceptions: 1) the Clerk of the Supreme Court
may confirm to the public that a complaint has been filed after an attorney has been
convicted of a crime, and 2) the Administrator may communicate with the Secretary of
the Clients' Security Fund about proceedings arising from attorney conduct which also
has produced claims against the fund.
74. ARDC RULES 1.5.
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plaint, but it is not reviewable by appeal to another body.75 The
hearing conducted by the board is not adversary in nature and
proceeds informally." Consequently, the Inquiry Board, in addi-
tion to assessing the adequacy of evidence supporting each
charge, serves as an arbitrator in misunderstandings or disputes
between attorneys and their clients. This aspect of the Inquiry
Board's activities provides a means of dealing with the "commu-
nication gap" which can develop because of public misconcep-
tions about the role of a lawyer or because of a specific attorney-
client communication problem."
If an Inquiry Board votes for issuance of a complaint, the
disciplinary matter then moves to the Hearing Board. It has
been observed that this Board serves the functions of a trial
court.79 Proceedings conducted by the Hearing Board are adver-
sarial in nature, and the Supreme Court Rules provide that ex-
cept where the court or ARDS rules create special procedures,"
attorney discipline is to be conducted in accord with the general
practice in civil cases.8 ' Special procedures have been created for
pleadings, service of process, discovery, conduct of hearings, mo-
tions, and default judgments. 2
A record of Hearing Board proceedings is kept and transmitted
to the Review Board along with the Hearing Board report, which
contains the board's findings and recommendations. 3 All matters
decided against the responding attorney proceed from the Hear-
ing Board to the Review Board unless the Administrator and re-
spondent agree that the Hearing Board should administer a rep-
rimand. A reprimand terminates action on the charge to which
it pertains, but it can be used as evidence against the attorney
75. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(a); ARDC RULES 2.1, 2.2.
76. ARDC RULES 2.2.
77. The role of attorney discipline in airing attorney-client squabbles is illustrated by
In re Sherman, 60 1Il.2d 590, 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975), where the Illinois Supreme Court
acknowledged that the charge under consideration had been filed after an entirely sepa-
rate disagreement between the attorney and his client. Id. at 591, 328 N.E.2d at 554.
78. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 75 3 (c).
79. Murphy, A Short History of Disciplinary Procedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 528, 531-
32 (1972).
80. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 753(c).
81. Id. Civil cases are conducted according to the Civil Practice Act, hL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, §1-94 (1975).
82. ARDC RuLEs art. IV, V, VII, VIII, IX.
83. ARDC RULES 9.2.
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in subsequent proceedings on differing charges."i Since both the
Hearing Board proceeding and the Administrator's records are
confidential, 5 a reprimand at the Hearing Board level ensures the
responding attorney that the entire disciplinary proceeding will
not be a matter of public record. As such, it constitutes the last
opportunity for guaranteed confidential disposition of a discipli-
nary proceeding."6
The Review Board 7 considers every Hearing Board report
which recommends disciplinary action and any other report on
which the Administrator requests review. It can reject or modify
any of the findings and/or remand to the Hearing Board for fur-
ther findings. Like the Hearing Board, the Review Board may
terminate the proceedings with a reprimand if the respondent
and Administrator are in agreement. Unlike the Hearing Board
reprimand, however, the Review Board may choose to administer
its reprimand either privately or publicly."
When the Review Board recommends discipline 9 rather than
administering a reprimand or dismissing the charge, it files a
report with the supreme court which reviews the complete record
of the case. \lthough very few cases have moved to the supreme
court level ider the new rules,90 the court has given no indication
of changing its prior approach of de novo review of the record.8 '
The Illinois attorney discipline procedure is complete when the
supreme court acts. If the court decides to discipline the attorney,
it will do so by censure, suspension or disbarment of the attorney.
Any such disposition is a matter of public record, as are all pro-
ceedings before the court.
There is much flexibility in handling attorney discipline under
84. ARDC RULES 9.4.
85. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 766.
86. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 769.
87. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(d).
88. ARDC RULES 10.4.
89. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 753(d), (e).
90. Among the first cases to be prosecuted under the new system were In re Washington,
62 Ill.2d 23, 338 N.E.2d 177 (1975) and In re Beil, 61 Ill.2d 378, 335 N.E.2d 485 (1975).
There were other cases which did not result in published opinions. The ARDC 1975
ANNUAL REPORT chart 11 indicates that the supreme court disposed of nine disciplinary
cases during the period from February 1, 1973 through June 30, 1975.
91. See, e.g., In re Sherman, 60 ll.2d 590, 328 N.E.2d 553 (1975), where the supreme




the ARDS rules. The only exceptions to this are mandatory proce-
dures where an attorney has been convicted of a crime involving
fraud or moral turpitude,92 or has been subjected to attorney
discipline in another state. 3 This flexibility is evidenced by two
ARDS procedures which permit an attorney to by-pass any or all
of the hearing and review procedures. 4 These are disbarment on
consent95 and voluntary transfer to inactive status. 6 Both involve
a voluntary petition to the supreme court which, if accepted,
terminates an attorney's right to practice. The court's acceptance
of a petition for disbarment on consent terminates the discipli-
nary proceeding out of which it arose. A voluntary transfer to
inactive status, on the other hand, results only in a suspension of
the disciplinary proceedings pending against the attorney. 7
After suspension, disbarment, disbarment on consent, or vol-
untary or involuntary transfer to inactive status, an attorney can
obtain reinstatement to the bar by filing a petition with the
ARDS Administrator. 8 The Hearing and Review Boards hear evi-
dence and argument on the petition and make recommendations
to the supreme court, following basically the same procedure used
in disciplinary proceedings.9 After reinstatement from inactive
92. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761.
93. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 763.
94. Some indication of the frequency with which attorneys use the procedures is given
by chart 3 of the ARDC 1975 ANNUAL REPORT. It shows that of 41 cases dealt with by the
Hearing Boards during the year, 20 resulted in voluntary motions to strike the respon-
dent's name from the roll of attorneys.
95. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 762.
96. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 770.
97. The language of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 770 regarding the disposition of pend-
ing disciplinary proceedings is in discretionary terms, so it may be that a transfer to
inactive status also can terminate a disciplinary proceeding.
The rules establishing the ARDS also provide for removal of attorneys for non-
disciplinary reasons. When an attorney is adjudicated mentally incompetent or is involun-
tarily committed to a mental institution, transfer to inactive status is virtually automatic.
ILL. SuP. CT. R. 757. If the Hearing and Review Boards find an attorney unfit to practice
because of mental disorder or addiction to alcohol or drugs, he or she is transferred to
inactive status. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 758.
98. ARDC RULES 11.1. In addition to supplying a great deal of financial and biographi-
cal data, the applicant for reinstatement must show "that he is fit to resume the practice
of law and that his resumption of the practice would not be adverse to the public interest,"
ARDC RULES 11.1, para. 17. The rule sets out specific requirements for a petition under
Rule 767 for reinstatement after suspension or disbarment. There are no specifically stated
requirements for a petition under Rule 759 for reinstatement after transfer to inactive
status.
99. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 759 (reinstatement after transfer to inactive status); 767 (rein-
1977]
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W [Vol. 26:325
status, any disciplinary proceedings which were suspended at the
time the attorney became inactive may be resumed."'"
V. ASSESSMENT OF THE ILLINOIS ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM IN
LIGHT OF ITS PURPOSES
The purpose of Illinois attorney discipline is the protection of
the public by the maintenance of the integrity of the bar.""1 The
ARDS procedures, while sharing this purpose, evidence addi-
tional objectives: guaranteeing that the responding attorney be
given a fair hearing'02 and disciplining conduct which brings the
profession or the courts into disrepute. The underlying goal of the
trio of ARDS purposes is the maintenance of a particular public
image. This image may be enhanced simply by the public being
aware that the profession is concerned with enforcing ethical
standards. '"'3 Conversely, the secrecy in which the ARDS works
statement after suspension or disbarment).
100. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 757, 758, 759.
101. In re Nowak, 62 ll.2d 279, 342 N.E.2d 25 (1976). The United States Supreme Court
has stated a parallel purpose for federal disciplinary proceedings. Theard v. United States,
354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957); Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824). This purpose
is pursued by enforcement against several types of attorney activity. First, the proceedings
impose discipline for attorney conduct which directly hampers or destroys protection of
legal rights or public access to remedies. An example of this type of conduct is the failure
of an attorney to pursue his client's claim so that the client loses his remedy when the
statute of limitations period expires. In re Lingle, 27 Ill.2d 459, 189 N.E.2d 342 (1963)
(attorney charged, among other things, with causing his client to lose a cause of action
by his failure to proceed expeditiously). Second, the proceedings discipline conduct which,
although not directly related to professional activities, indicates a general lack of fitness
to practice law. One such activity is income tax evasion. In re Lacob, 50 Ill.2d 277, 278
N.E.2d 795 (1972) (respondent attorney disciplined after having been convicted of tax
evasion). Third, the disciplinary system censures attorney actions which tend to bring
either the courts or the legal profession into disrepute, that is, actions which without
justification damage the public image or perception of the courts or profession. In re
Phelps, 55 Ill.2d 319, 322-23, 303 N.E.2d 13, 15 (1973) (attorney suspended as a result of
having made a series of allegations and charges against judges and attorneys involved in
case she had handled).
102. This intent is manifested by the detailed procedures for hearings, discovery,
responsive pleading, and review of findings which go far beyond the minimal notice and
hearing which satisfied due process in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 540
(1869). Although In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968), was decided more recently than
Randall, it added nothing to the notice and hearing requirements articulated in Randall.
This is so because Ruffalo involved a situation where the attorney was given no notice of
a charge against him, whereas the respondent in Randall was given a week's notice. There
is no indication of whether more recent decisions defining Fourteenth Amendment due
process requirements in other judicial contexts are also applicable to attorney discipline.
103. The press has given some coverage to the ARDS in general. See, e.g., Court Disci-
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
may create the impression that the profession protects its own.""
Theoretically, maintenance of the integrity of the bar is served
by a "halo" effect among attorneys; attorneys who might other-
wise engage in prohibited conduct may be prevented from doing
so by fear of discipline. However, a lack of knowledge about the
activities of the ARDS combined with the flexibility of the com-
mon law of ethics' 5 and with the relative unlikelihood that a
particular act of misconduct will be reported makes the required
standards of conduct very unclear to the practitioner. The aver-
age attorney probably will not feel compelled to comply with a
vague standard that is unlikely to be enforced.'"' The problems
resulting from vague standards of conduct are not the only obsta-
cles to attaining the ARDS goals. The ARDS Administrator must
receive information about the conduct.
The goals of protecting the public and guaranteeing a fair trial,
however, share an important similarity; the conduct disciplined
most frequently occurs in private activities of the attorney as he
conducts his personal or professional affairs. Therefore, in a par-
ticular case the ARDS is dependent on a small group of witnesses
or a single witness to give information as a complainant. Though
plines 13 Attorneys, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 28, 1974, §1B, at 24, col. 1; New Punitive
Rules for Lawyers Told, Chicago Tribune, May 25, 1973, §3, at 15, col. 5; High Court to
Discipline Lawyers, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 26, 1973, §1A, at 11, col. 5. The public is
unlikely to be aware of specific cases unless the attorney involved is well-known and the
proceeding against him or her advances to a non-confidential stage such as supreme court
disposition.
104. One means of assessing whether the public and the courts consider the ARDS to
be policing the conduct of the profession adequately would be to study trends in the use
of contempt and attorney malpractice. It may be that they are used as a compensation
for the failings of the ARDS. It may also be that they are used because of the advantages
they have for speed of enforcement and for recouping the damages resulting from the
attorney's misdeeds, respectively.
105. See Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the Bar": A Constitutional Approach to Non-
Professional Misconduct, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 317 (1965); Note, Disbarment: A Case
for Reform, 17 N.Y. L.F. 792 (1971).
106. Production of a halo effect is one means by which the ARDS can influence the
general competence of the bar. The fault approach to attorney discipline has severe limita-
tions for influencing competence, in the sense of expertise, in particular specialties or for
maintaining a minimum level of knowledge about current developments in the law. A
complete discussion of the assets and liabilities of the fault approach would require a
paper in itself. The issue has been addressed by others. See Marks & Cathcart, Discipline
within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193 (1974); Lyman,




the ARDS has the subpoena power,"7 the filing of a complaint is
completely voluntary. A person who may have information justi-
fying a complaint to the ARDS will either be a lay person or a
professional. The professionals, judges and attorneys, are in the
best position to assess an attorney's professional conduct or the
implications of his or her non-professional conduct on the attor-
ney's fitness to practice law. Yet the ARDS receives very few
complaints from legal professionals.' The bulk of the complaints
are received from lay people. Although they can observe and re-
port attorney misbehavior, reliance on lay people as the primary
source of complaints probably is misplaced because they may fail
to recognize, or may benefit from, their attorney's misconduct.' 9
Disciplining conduct which brings the profession or the courts
into disrepute, like disciplining other types of conduct, depends
on complaints being made to the ARDS. However, the depend-
ence may be relatively less in this case. Conduct that brings the
courts or profession into disrepute is likely to be conduct which
damages the public image of the legal institutions. Therefore, the
attorney's actions probably will be public knowledge. When this
is the case, the ARDS Administrator or an Inquiry Board can
initiate charges without depending on a complaint from outside
the system.
In addition to the problem of obtaining information, the ARDS
goal of granting the attorney a fair trial is hindered by several
107. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 754.
108. J. CARLIN, LAWYER'S ETHics (1966); H.H. Camp, The Ethical Defense Attorney
(1960) (unpublished thesis; Northwestern University School of Law Library).
109. 1) Usually the lay person is not involved in the "behind the scenes" activities
where misdeeds frequently occur and when involved he or she is unlikely to have sufficient
knowledge to distinguish ethical from unethical activity; 2) The non-attorney client who
feels that his own interests are served by his attorney's unethical behavior, indeed, who
considers it part of the service for which he pays, is not inclined to report the attorney;
and 3) The lay person is most likely to observe offenses by his own attorney and is usually
unwilling to disrupt the attorney-client relationship by making a report to the ARDS,
regardless of whether the client feels the attorney's actions serve the client's interests.
The result is that most complaints which the ARDS Administrator receives can be han-
dled by arbitration between attorneys and disgruntled clients, people for whom at least
the last two factors do not apply. Since these disincentives undoubtedly operate to prevent
many lay people who are aware of attorney misconduct from filing complaints, a great deal
of objectionable conduct is never brought to the ARDS Administrator's attention. As with
the failure of professionals to report misconduct, the failure of lay people to make reports




aspects of the system's procedure. Although many rights are
granted to the responding attorney, the standards set for attorney
conduct may be unrealistic or unjustly administered. For in-
stance, attorney disciplinary cases have been the occasion for
expression of high ideals for the profession. Though lofty lan-
guage"" may call the professional to aspirational goals, it also
carries the seeds of unfairness resulting from prosecution of disci-
plinary charges for the wrong reasons."' In addition to potential
unfairness arising from politically or socially motivated charges,
unfairness to the responding attorney can be caused by the poten-
tial for bias of the boards which conduct investigations and hear-
ings. At all levels of the disciplinary system, an accused attorney
is judged by other attorneys. The danger of bias arises from the
fact that many cases involve not only a specific act of misconduct
but also an implied challenge to the social mores of the legal
profession. Those members of the ARDS who hold conventional
values may find it hard to be objective when judging unorthodox
members. Although attorneys are trained in objectivity, it may
be difficult to remain objective when a personal standard is at
stake."'
Another aspect of the ARDS which calls into question the fair-
ness of treatment received by the responding attorney is the un-
certainty produced by some aspects of the common law of eth-
ics."' The Illinois Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly that
110. People v. Sherwin, 364 I1. 350, 359, 4 N.E.2d 477, 480-81 (1936).
It is the duty of a lawyer to so conduct and guard his activities as a member of
a most honorable profession that he will not be repeatedly open to assaults upon
his honor. It is, of course, true that a lawyer of the highest integrity may be
undeservedly assailed in good faith or under corrupt motives. In either case it
is his duty to safeguard his reputation, and a failure to do so in repeated instan-
ces raises a suspicion of unfitness and tends to discredit the profession.
111. The terms "integrity" and "honor" generally describe an ethical stance, but their
breadth makes them susceptible to reinterpretation to include a particular political or
social stance. The flexibility and confidentiality of the disciplinary procedures can be
valuable tools in the hands of those who seek to use them to enforce such social and
political standards. Confidentiality can protect the accuser as well as the accused from
public observation, making politically or socially motivated attacks possible without any
danger of publicity to the accuser. The absence of a statute of limitations combined with
the course of conduct type of charge and appearance of impropriety standard give oppor-
tunity for manufacturing substantial charges from a group of minor or technical offenses
over a long period of time.
112. This problem has been discussed in Note, Constitutional Law - The Right to a
Jury Trial in Disbarment Proceedings, 68 MicH. L. REV. 604, 611 (1970).
113. It has been argued that the vagueness of attorney discipline standards and proce-
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each disciplinary case is unique and therefore that decisions
about discipline to be administered must be made independently
of decisions in earlier cases."4 Even in crimes involving moral
turpitude, in which the Administrator is required to seek suspen-
sion," 5 stare decisis is not applied in defining moral turpitude.'
Therefore attorneys are subject to an unclear set of ethical rules.
The introduction of mitigating evidence, while sometimes help-
ful to the accused attorney, may actually lead to discipline of an
attorney for irrelevant reasons. Frequently, mitigation reaches
the full scope of the respondent's professional and personal life,
including whether he passed the bar examination the first time
he took it, family status, and whether he pays his bill on time."7
The habitual use of mitigating evidence creates a bias against the
unorthodox practitioner who may not be able to present the ex-
pected types of evidence or refuses to place his whole identity on
trial by presenting evidence in mitigation.
The final factor introducing the potential for unfairness into
the ARDS is the duty imposed on an attorney to provide informa-
tion in support of the case against him unless he can claim his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." ' This
duty is based on the understanding that the practice of law is a
privilege which carries duties as conditions for retention of the
privilege." 9 While prosecution is impossible without evidence and
dures is a defect of constitutional proportions. See Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the
Bar": A Constitutional Approach to Non-Professional Misconduct, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J.
299, 317 (1965); Note, Disbarment: A Case for Reform, 17 N.Y.L.F. 792 (1971).
114. In re Nesselson, 35 1ll.2d 454, 461, 220 N.E.2d 409, 412 (1966).
115. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 761.
116. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 754.
117. The following is a sampling of the types of evidence considered in mitigation,
accompanied by examples of cases. In re Sherman, 60 Ill.2d 590, 593, 328 N.E.2d 553, 555
(1975) (length of respondent's practice); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 309, 288 N.E.2d 9, 11
(1972) (respondent's financial position at time of offense); In re Agin, 45 Ill.2d 126, 130,
256 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1970) (youthfulness of respondent); In re Gavin, 21 Ill.2d 237, 245,
171 N.E.2d 588, 592 (1961) (personality of complaining client); In re Eaton, 14 Ill.2d 338,
:343-44, 152 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1958) (respondent's false testimony at the disciplinary pro-
ceeding); In re Fisher, 15 Ill.2d 139, 150, 153 N.E.2d 832, 838-39 (1958) (respondent's ethics
record); In re Cohn, 10 Ill.2d 186, 191, 139 N.E.2d 301, 303-04 (1956) (respondent's re-
morse); In re Serrittella, 5 Ill.2d 392, 396, 125 N.E.2d 531, 533 (1955) (reputation and
character witnesses); In re Power, 407 I1. 525, 530-31, 96 N.E.2d 460, 463 (1950) (respon-
dent's restitution).
118. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
119. In re Royal, 29 Ill.2d 458, 194 N.E.2d 242; People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y.
465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
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the accused attorney frequently is in a unique position to supply
the pertinent facts about the case, it remains that this rule makes
it possible for a completely innocent person to be put to the choice
of supplying all information he has on a topic or being prosecuted
for failure to cooperate in an investigation. This fact makes the
disciplinary system a potential tool for harassment.
VI. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ILLINOIS ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE AND
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
It has been seen that the ARDS as it now exists has flaws which
inhibit the attainment of its primary purposes.' The existence
of these flaws raises the question of whether they can be corrected
while maintaining the strengths of the present system. The simi-
larity of the ARDS procedural rules to those used in other judicial
proceedings suggests that a useful avenue of inquiry may be an
examination of the procedures used in other types of proceedings.
Historically, the procedures used in disciplinary proceedings have
been modeled on the civil trial. 2 ' However, upon closer examina-
tion, it can be seen that attorney discipline, as it exists in Illinois,
has the same basic elements as a criminal proceeding. 2' When
the ARDS Administrator files a complaint and prosecutes the
case, the attorney and the people of the state are the real parties
to the disciplinary proceeding. This is highlighted by the supreme
court's statement of the general purpose for attorney discipline as
the protection of the public by maintenance of the integrity of the
bar. '3 In a criminal proceeding the parties also are the defendant
120. See notes 101 & 102 and accompanying text supra.
121. In re Damisch, 38 Ill.2d 195, 206, 230 N.E.2d 254, 260 (1967); In re Needham, 364
Ill. 65, 68, 4 N.E.2d 19, 21 (1936). See also Niles & Kaye, Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or
Millstone in Bar Discipline?, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124 (1967).
122. Numerous authors have observed a similarity between attorney disciplinary proce-
dures, especially those proposed by the Clark Commission and criminal procedures. See
Marks & Cathcart, Discipline within the Legal Profession: Is it Self-Regulation?, 1974 U.
ILL. L.F. 193, 230 (1974); R. McCracken, The Maintenance of Professional Standards:
Duty and Obligation of the Courts, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 73 (1955); Note, Black v. State
Bar: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Disbarment Proceedings, 8 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS & Civ. LiB. L. REV. 633, 642 (1973). For an argument showing the criminal nature
of attorney discipline by analogy to criminal contempt see Constitutional Law - The
Right to a Jury Trial in Disbarment Proceedings, 68 MICH. L. REV. 604, 606-07 (1970). For
a collection of cases where penalties not involving imprisonment were held to be criminal
in nature see Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Disci-
plinary Proceedings, 72 MICH. L. REV. 84, 103 (1973).
123. In re Nowak, 62 Ill.2d 279, 342 N.E.2d 25 (1976).
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and the state, and the general purpose for the criminal justice
system is the protection of the public from the harm wrought by
criminal offenders.
In addition to the similarity between the parties to attorney
discipline and those to criminal cases, there is a similarity in the
ends sought. Although historically it has been argued that attor-
ney discipline involves a dispute over a property right and is
therefore civil in nature,"4 attorney discipline also can be seen as
the imposition of a penalty for misbehavior. In fact, the Illinois
Supreme Court has spoken of disbarment as a "penalty" to be
meted out "where the punishment is fully deserved."'' 5 The
United States Supreme Court concurred in this opinion by refer-
ring to disbarment proceedings as "quasi-criminal" and to dis-
barment itself as a "punishment or penalty imposed on the law-
yer."' 6 The practice of fitting discipline to the circumstances of
a particular case has the appearance of making "the punishment
fit the crime." Indeed, if the sole issue in attorney disciplinary
cases were a dispute over the property right to practice law, the
only possible result of attorney discipline would be preservation
or denial of that right, that is, disbarment or no disbarment.
Therefore, the fact that intermediate types of discipline are used
indicates the penalty nature of the discipline.
Where there is a possibility of penalties criminal in nature, the
responding attorney should be entitled to due process rights af-
forded criminal defendants. The supreme court has catalogued
the various tests which have been used singularly or in combina-
tion to determine whether a penalty is criminal in character:
Whether the sanction involved an affirmative disability or re-
straint, whether it has historically been regarded as a punish-
ment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative pur-
124. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882); People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y.
465, 470, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928).
125. In re Veach, 1 1Il.2d 264, 273, 115 N.E.2d 257, 261-62 (1953).
126. 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968). At least one author has inferred from Ruffalo that the
Supreme Court is ready to apply more stringent due process requirements to attorney
discipline. Note, Self-Incrimination: Privilege, Immunity, and Comment in Bar Discipli-
nary Proceedings, 72 MicH. L. REv. 84, 89-90 (1973).
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pose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often
point in differing directions.1"7
A number of these factors are applicable in the attorney disci-
pline context. The ultimate penalty of disbarment involves an
affirmative restraint from the practice of law and is considered
by the courts as a punishment. Whether attorney discipline is
imposed only when scienter is found is not clear from the cases,
although it is clear that a showing of intent often has been
required. 2 ' Attorney discipline sometimes also applies to crimi-
nal behavior. For instance, an attorney's taking of a client's
money may be subject both to criminal prosecution for theft and
to professional discipline.
Despite these factors indicating attorney discipline is criminal
in nature, it could be argued that the traditional purpose of attor-
ney discipline, judicial supervision of those who practice before
the courts, makes a disciplinary action civil in nature. If this were
the genuine purpose of attorney discipline, however, one would
expect the goal of the proceedings to be improvement of the qual-
ity of legal services available to the public. It is debatable
whether this end is served well or at all by the spectrum of penal-
ties currently used in attorney discipline. The choice to impose
reprimand or censure, rather than to require improvement
through refresher courses or apprenticeship with a more compe-
tent attorney, indicates that the system as it now exists fits the
punitive purpose much more closely than the quality of the pro-
fession purpose. Surely disbarment is necessary to maintenance
of quality of the bar when a practitioner shows signs of being
unable or unwilling to improve. But a system focused on compe-
tence would not choose to punish in intermediate cases. Instead,
it would make findings of incompetence and then seek to restore
competence. Other indications of the punitive purpose are the
fault basis for imposition of penalties and the use of language
such as "attorney discipline."
The similarity of attorney disciplinary proceedings to criminal
proceedings is further evidenced by the similarity of the social
goals served by the two systems.129 Most cases seek future compli-
127. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
128. See note 42 supra.
129. The existence of both structures provides reassurance to the public that protection
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ance with group standards. Toward this end the criminal system
imposes prison sentences and fines whereas the attorney discipli-
nary system imposes censure and suspension. In a few cases, both
systems discard the incorrigible either by committing them to life
imprisonment, or removing them from the professional com-
munity by disbarment.
Finally, the observed similarities between attorney discipline
and the criminal justice system have been acknowledged implic-
itly by the structure which the supreme court has chosen for the
ARDS. The inquiry phase of attorney discipline is very similar to
a grand jury hearing or preliminary hearing in the criminal con-
text. Both the Inquiry Board hearing and the grand jury or pre-
liminary hearing seek to establish whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify prosecution of a charge. Both are characterized
by a weeding-out process which separates the most provable
charges from the rest. In one, this takes the form of plea bargain-
ing and in the other, of arbitration between complainant and
responding attorney. The Hearing Board proceeding, much like
a criminal trial, is the trial in which the responding attorney and
the ARDS prosecutor present their cases to the tribunal."" After
the Hearing Board proceeding, disciplinary matters decided
against the accused attorney proceed to the Review Board as a
matter of course. This is similar to the criminal defendant's right
to appeal. 3' The format used in Review Board proceedings is very
similar to that used in the appellate courts with both sides pre-
senting briefs and oral arguments. 3 ' The final state forum for ei-
ther the disciplinary case or the criminal case is the Illinois Su-
preme Court. Although the ARDS theoretically contemplates a
de novo review of the record of a case when it is considered at each
level of the system, in practice the Hearing Board's assessment
of the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses later
is available to those who need it. The occasional case from either system which receives
public attention provides the cathartic effect of showing that society's views are being
enforced against wrongdoers. The social goals of the two systems are similar.
130. Murphy, A Short History of Disciplinary Procedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 528,
531-32(1972).
131. A United States district court recently has decided in a challenge of the New York
legislature-created attorney disciplinary system that due process does not require an ap-
peal as of right for the disciplined attorney, who under that system initially is tried by a
court. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182, 194 (E.D. N.Y. 1975).




is relied on much as appellate courts rely on the factual determi-
nations of a criminal trial court.'33 Although attorney discipline
is an exercise of the supreme court's inherent judicial power and
each disciplinary decision is said to be reviewable by the court,
the only cases which the court actually considers are those which
have not been disposed of within the ARDS," 4 just as the criminal
cases which reach the court are those which have not been re-
solved at a lower level in the criminal court system.
VII. ASSESSMENT OF THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINE AND THE CRIMINAL MODEL
Though there are many similarities between the criminal and
the attorney discipline systems, there also are some significant
variances.'35 An examination of these dissimiliarities will demon-
strate how adoption of the criminal model may be applied pro-
ductively to the attorney discipline procedure.
A. Requirements for Statutory Clarity
The Federal Constitution requires that statutes upon which
criminal prosecutions are based comply with a high standard of
clarity. 3 ' This standard is applied in order to ensure that no
criminal defendant is denied due process by being prosecuted for
activity which he had no notice was illegal or by being the object
of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.'37 Under the ARDS,
133. In re Bossov, 60 Ill.2d 439, 441, 328 N.E.2d 309, 311 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
928 (1975), expresses the Illinois Supreme Court's reliance on the findings of the Hearing
Board.
134. The only exceptions to this are the several types of petitions which must be pre-
sented directly to the court. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761, 763.
135. This discussion of the variances between criminal and attorney cases is not exhaus-
tive. Other areas of substantial differences include: whether a constitutional right to
counsel should be carried over into attorney discipline; whether the attorney-client privi-
lege should have the same scope and effect in attorney discipline cases as it does else-
where; whether there should be a statute of limitations applicable to attorney discipline;
whether standards for sufficiency of charges applicable in criminal trials should apply in
attorney discipline; and whether a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights vary significantly from an accused attorney's.
136. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 505, 515 (1948).
137. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). See generally Comment,
Legislative Requirement of Definiteness in Statutory Standards, 53 MICH. L. REv. 264
(1954); Note, Constitutional Law, Void for Vagueness: An Escape From Statutory
Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272 (1948); Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21
MICH. L. REv. 831 (1923).
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however, only a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
and imposition of professional discipline in another jurisdiction",,
necessarily will result in disciplinary action. All prosecutions by
the ARDS Administrator not fitting within one of these categories
are conducted under the general mandate to prosecute "conduct
of attorneys which tends to defeat the administration of justice
or to bring the courts or legal profession into disrepute. .. .
This statement does little to put the attorney on notice concern-
ing which particular actions will result in prosecution.
Some clarity may be introduced by the enforcement of the
Code of Professional Responsibility in attorney disciplinary pro-
ceedings. However, the Illinois Supreme Court consistently has
held that codes of ethics are merely "safe guides" for professional
conduct and that their application is discretionary. 4 Even if the
Code were applied mandatorily, there is doubt'as to whether it
provides enough clarity to meet due process standards.'
In addition to the tenuous position of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, there are other barriers to clarity in the Illinois
attorney disciplinary system. First, the liberal use of any argua-
bly relevant evidence in mitigation' may create the impression
among attorneys that avoiding professional discipline depends as
much upon one's general compliance with the professional
138. It is interesting to note that "moral turpitude" has been held to have a sufficiently
clear common law meaning to satisfy due process requirements when used in a criminal
statute. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951).
139. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 752.
140. The discretionary nature of a criminal prosecutor's choices about which cases to
pursue is not being overlooked. That discretion is necessitated by the practical impossibil-
ity of prosecuting all cases when police, prosecution and judicial manpower is limited. It
does not negate the fact that every criminal statute theoretically creates a mandatory duty
of enforcement in the prosecutor.
141. The drafters of the Code hoped to forestall attack of the Disciplinary Rules on
grounds of arbitrariness by inclusion of the explanatory Ethical Considerations upon
which the Disciplinary Rules are based. Wright, Code of Professional Responsibility: Its
History and Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1, 11 (1970). The commentators have agreed that
the Code's Disciplinary Rules are within constitutional limits. Symposium, 48 TEX. L.
REV. 255 (1970). However, major criticism has been attracted by the Disciplinary Rules
of Canon 1, Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession,
48 TEX. L. REV. 267 (1970); Note, Disbarment: A Case for Reform, 17 N.Y.L.F. 792 (1971).
For Disciplinary Rule 2-103 regarding group legal services, see Note, Prepaid Legal Serv-
ices, Ethical Codes, and the Snares of Anti-Trust, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 754 (1975); and
for Disciplinary Rule 7-107 limiting pre-trial publicity, see Note, Attorney Discipline and
the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 922 (1974).
142. See note 117 and accompanying text supra.
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group's norms as it does on one's actions in particular circum-
stances. Second, the use of the course of dealing form of com-
plaint' is a vague standard and does not make explicit what
constitutes a disbarable offense. Finally, an action which does not
transgress the bounds described by the ethical code may still be
grounds for discipline if it renders the attorney's reputation as-
sailable.'44
As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out, the anti-
vagueness standard for criminal statutes is based on a sense of
fair treatment for the criminal defendant.'45 Therefore, applica-
tion of the standard in the attorney discipline context would be
consistent with the concern for fair treatment of the responding
attorney demonstrated by the ARDS. In addition, increased clar-
ity in the standards for conduct actually being enforced could
increase the deterrent impact of the attorney disciplinary system
by making minimum standards for professional conduct more
visible to the average attorney.
B. Self-Incrimination Privilege
Another crucial variance between the criminal and disciplinary
systems is in the application of the Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination privilege. This privilege is actually two related
privileges: (1) the witness privilege which protects a witness in
any type of proceeding from being required to give testimony
which may subject him to a penalty, and (2) the defendant privi-
lege which protects a criminal defendant from being forced to
take the stand in a trial against himself.4 '
The United States Supreme Court, in a case involving the wit-
ness privilege, held that an attorney cannot be disbarred for
asserting his constitutional privilege in a criminal proceeding
against him.'47 The Fifth Amendment was intended to protect
people from losing their liberty on their own testimony.'48 The
143. See notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text supra.
144. In re Krasner, 32 Ill.2d 121, 204 N.E.2d 10 (1965).
145. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
146. B. GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 232-
34 (1973 ed.).
147. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
148. The proposed purposes and bases for the privileges against self-incrimination are
numerous. The primary ones are protecting people from being forced to give testimony
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Supreme Court did not address the issue whether this privilege
also protects attorneys when, instead of being subject to impri-
sonment, they are subject only to professional discipline. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in In re Schwartz,4 ' has made its opinion
clear on this issue. In Schwartz the court held that when an
attorney has been granted immunity from prosecution, testimony
given under such immunity can be used in disciplinary proceed-
ings. Therefore, the privilege under the Fifth Amendment does
not protect the attorney from discipline when there is no threat
of loss of liberty. The Illinois Supreme Court also has held that
the defendant privilege against self-incrimination does not apply
in attorney disciplinary proceedings. 5 "
A determination that Illinois attorney disciplinary proceedings
are criminal in nature would require application of both the wit-
ness and defendant privileges. In the absence of such a holding,
there is, nevertheless, strong argument for requiring the self-
incrimination privilege to be expanded to protect against a pen-
alty of professional discipline. 5' Such an expansion would be in
accordance with both the purpose of the self-incrimination pro-
tection as well as that of the ARDS. The purpose of the privilege,
to maintain a balance between the government and the individ-
ual, would be served because expansion of the privilege would
prevent the problems created when an individual is forced to give
evidence against himself that leads to his punishment.5 '
Expansion of the self-incrimination privilege, while serving the
ARDS purpose of providing fair treatment of the attorney, may
against themselves and the maintenance of a fair government-individual balance by re-
moving the possibility of inquisitorial questioning. 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE 307-10 (3d ed.
1961).
149. 51 Ill.2d 334, 337-38, 282 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1962), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1962).
When a witness is entitled to claim the privilege against self-incrimination, he can be
forced to testify if given a grant of immunity from prosecution on the basis of his testi-
mony. The grant of immunity is a substitute for the denied privilege against self-
incrimination. Therefore, it must take in the full scope of the privilege; it must immunize
the witness against all penalties which would have justified the use of the privilege. Thus,
a holding that an attorney disciplinary proceeding may be based on evidence obtained
under a grant of immunity is an implicit holding that the attorney-witness could not have
based a claim of the privilege solely on fear of professional discipline resulting from his
testimony.
150. In re Royal, 29 Ill.2d 458, 194 N.E.2d 242 (1963).
151. See, e.g., In re Schwartz, 51 Ill.2d 334, 282 N.E.2d 689 (1972); In re Royal, 29 Ill.2d
458, 194 N.E.2d 242 (1963).
152. People v. Nunnley, 34 Il. App.3d 4, 339 N.E.2d 537 (1st Dist. 1975).
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reduce to some extent the effectiveness of the ARDS in attaining
its other goals. This danger lies primarily in the fact that the
expanded privilege would make it more difficult to obtain evi-
dence relating to attorney misconduct. The losses of evidence
obtained by forced self-incrimination may be partially recouped
by improved investigative techniques and resources. The remain-
ing losses must be weighed against the advantage of an improved
balance between the individual lawyer and the government.
C. Burden of Proof
In addition to differences in degree of clarity in statutes and
application of Fifth Amendment privileges, the criminal and dis-
ciplinary systems also differ on evidentiary issues. The first area
of evidentiary dissimilarity is the standard of burden of proof.
The standard in criminal cases is "beyond a reasonable doubt"'53
while the civil court requirement is a "preponderance of evi-
dence."'' The Supreme Court Rules governing the ARDS ex-
pressly require that the burden of proof in attorney disciplinary
hearings be "clear and convincing."'' 5 Adopting this in-between
standard reflects the position of the court that the importance of
the issues at stake in attorney disciplinary proceedings lies be-
tween civil and criminal proceedings.
Application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the
attorney disciplinary context would require the conclusion that
the rights involved are of comparable magnitude to those in-
volved in a criminal trial.' The supreme court has at least
considered this position,'57 and in certain circumstances applied
this heavier burden. However, while disbarment is a heavy pen-
alty which should not be administered cavalierly, it does not
entail a denial of physical liberty, which is frequently at stake in
criminal trials. Combining this consideration with the difficulties
153. American Nat'l Fire Co. v. Scholl, 1 Ill.App.3d 322, 272 N.E.2d 447 (2d Dist. 1971).
154. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 753(c).
155. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 798 (2d ed. 1972).
156. It is interesting to note that in the past the Illinois Supreme Court has chosen to
apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard to attorney discipline cases: People v. Ader,
263 Il. 319, 104 N.E. 1060 (1914). See note 42 supra.
Burden of proof may be another aspect of the proceedings which has become clouded
by the free introduction of mitigating evidence at the hearing on the merits. In re Moore,
8 Ill.2d 373, 134 N.E.2d 324 (1956).
157. See notes 107 & 108 and accompanying text supra.
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of investigation peculiar to attorney discipline,' it may be unrea-
sonable to require that the ARDS Administrator prove cases be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Danger of unfairness to the responding
attorney can be minimized by expansion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege, which incidentally would increase the burden on the
Administrator by effectively requiring that charges be proved
with independently obtained evidence.' 5
D. Character Evidence and Mitigation
The second area of evidentiary dissimiliarity is in the use of
character and mitigation evidence. As is commonly true in other
states,16° Illinois attorney disciplinary proceedings use common
law evidentiary rules as tools for sifting the facts relevant to a
case.'"' It has been the practice in Illinois criminal trials to follow
the standard rule that, except where relevant to the charge or
used for impeachment, the prosecutor is not permitted to open
the issue of the accused's character.' 2 Character, however, is
always relevant to the question of what sentence a criminal de-
fendant will be given if convicted. Thus, character evidence is
generally introduced in a criminal case at a post-conviction sen-
tencing hearing.' 3
In disciplinary proceedings, on the other hand, evidence on the
merits of the charge and on the proper penalty to be imposed are
taken at the same hearing. The mitigation evidence theoretically
is considered only on the issue of the discipline to be recom-
mended and is not to influence the Board's judgment on the
158. See notes 146-50 and accompanying text supra.
159. Comment, Evidence-Rules of Evidence in Disbarment, Habeas Corpus, and
Grand Jury Proceedings, 58 MICH. L. REv. 1218, 1219-20 (1960).
160. See, e.g., In re Serritella, 5 1ll.2d 392, 125 N.E.2d 531 (1955); In re Mitgang, 385
Ill. 311, 52 N.E.2d 807 (1944).
161. See, e.g., People v. Redmond, 50 Ill.2d 313, 278 N.E.2d 766 (1972); People v. Lewis,
25 1ll.2d 442, 185 N.E.2d 254 (1962); People v. Holt, 398 111. 606, 76 N.E.2d 474 (1947);
People v. Wells, 80 Ill.App.2d 187, 224 N.E.2d 288 (1967). The federal courts also adhere
to this rule. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); Greer v. United States, 245
U.S. 559 (1918).
162. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-4-1(3) (1975). The Illinois Supreme Court has held
that the sentencing hearing is not mandated constitutionally, nor does the statute confer
rights of constitutional magnitude. People v. Wade, 47 Ill.2d 38, 41, 264 N.E.2d 207, 209
(1970).
163. See, e.g., In re Harris, 383 Ill. 336, 344, 50 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1943).
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merits of the charge.' However, it appears that in some of the
Illinois Supreme Court's opinions the court has confused the is-
sues. This may indicate a high probability that the issues some-
times are confused by the Hearing and Review Boards. 5 Failure
to keep the issues clearly defined makes it treacherously easy for
the disciplinary body to make its decision on its opinion of the
responding attorney's character rather than on the merits of the
case. This danger is exacerbated by the broad range of evidence
admitted in mitigation."6 Adoption of a pre-sentencing hearing,
similar to that used in a criminal trial, would help to insure that
the ARDS members rendered their verdict on the facts.
E. Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule, probably the best known of the
evidentiary rules, is another significant variance between crimi-
nal and attorney disciplinary cases. This rule bars the use in
criminal cases of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
search.6 7 Broadly stated, the purpose of the rule is to prevent the
government from benefiting by the illegal actions of any govern-
ment employee." 8 Narrowly stated, the purpose of the rule is to
deter only illegal police activity. The latter reading appears to be
closest to the current United States Supreme Court's approach." 9
Hence, the usefulness of applying the exclusionary rule in attor-
ney discipline proceedings depends on whether the application of
the rule in that context would serve to prevent the police from
engaging in illegal activity.
164. For instance, in one case the court looked at reputation evidence to help it decide
between conflicting evidence on the merits. In re Heirich, 10 Ill.2d 357, 389, 140 N.E.2d
825, 841 (1957). The court's vacillation on the question whether to require proof of specific
intent to act unethically indicates an uncertainty about whether to apply mitigation
evidence to the merits or to the penalty. In re Mitgang, 385 Ill. 311, 333, 52 N.E.2d 807,
817 (1944) (intent not necessary); In re Lasecki, 358 I1. 69, 72, 192 N.E. 655, 657 (1934)
(intent required); People v. Lotterman, 353 Ill. 399, 409, 187 N.E. 424, 428 (1933) (intent
required); In re Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys of the Sanitary District, 351
Ili. 206, 219-23, 184 N.E. 332, 340 (1932) (no intent necessary).
165. See note 117 supra.
166. The rule was introduced by Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made
applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
167. B. GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL LImrTATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 112
(1973 ed.).
168. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
169. Emslie v. State Bar of Calif., 11 Cal.3d 210, 520 P.2d 991, 113 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1974).
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The California Supreme Court has addressed this issue'7 ° and
held that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to California attor-
ney disciplinary proceedings. This conclusion was reached by bal-
ancing the purposes of attorney discipline against the purposes of
the exclusionary rule. The court observed that although the state
is a party to attorney disciplinary cases, the police are not
charged with enforcing attorney discipline. Consequently, they
are unlikely to be concerned with or aware of the impact of their
work on those proceedings. Therefore, any regulatory effect pro-
duced by excluding illegally-obtained evidence from an attorney
disciplinary proceeding would be minimal. In balancing this min-
imal effect against the purpose of attorney discipline to protect
the public against attorney misconduct, the court concluded that
public protection through attorney discipline was more impor-
tant.,7'
This rationale is very persuasive against barring the use of
evidence illegally obtained by police, since the interest of the
police in attorney discipline is likely to be minimal or non-
existent. A parallel rule, however, may be of use in attorney disci-
plinary proceedings. Such a rule would exclude from attorney
disciplinary proceedings evidence illegally obtained by those
charged with investigating attorney disciplinary charges, the
ARDS investigators and members of the Inquiry Boards. These
people have a concern for and involvement with attorney disci-
pline which is similar to the concern of the police for criminal
prosecution. Therefore, the application of an exclusionary rule
would deter illegal activity in the course of their investigations.,,'
F. Juries
A final distinction between the criminal and disciplinary proce-
dures, which indicates the present philosophical differences be-
tween the two systems, is in the utilization of a jury. The Clark
170. Id. at 226-30, 520 P.2d at 1000-02, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 184-86.
171. This discussion assumes that barring the use of illegally-obtained evidence from a
judicial proceeding inhibits the person who obtained it illegally from repeating the illegal
act. The existence of such a regulatory effect is an assumption underlying the exclusionary
rule. The assumption is taken as a given here, although it has been challenged. F. INBAU,
CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 161 (1974).
172. CLARK COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 136-37. At the time of the report a
jury trial was permitted in attorney disciplinary proceedings only in Texas, Georgia, and
North Carolina and in practice was rarely used.
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Commission criticized the use of juries in attorney discipline
cases on the ground that a lay jury would not understand the
practice of law or the concepts underlying the ethical code and
that a jury may apply a different standard than it was instructed
to follow. 173 Both of these criticisms, however, can be directed at
the use of juries in other situations. 7 ' Probably the root fear pre-
venting the use of juries in attorney discipline cases is the feeling
that a lay jury consistently would rule against the accused be-
cause of a general dislike for lawyers.
Assuming for the sake of argument that this is true, a jury still
remains a powerful mechanism for injecting impartiality into a
controversy. A jury composed of individuals who are not person-
ally involved with a case is better suited than either of the par-
ties to draw conclusions about the facts of a case.' Therefore,
the introduction of an impartial party to the proceedings would
help reduce the danger of bias and ensure the responding attor-
ney a fair result. A means of achieving the impartiality provided
by a jury, may be to add non-lawyers to the boards within the
ARDS. An advantage of this plan is that a lay person can to some
extent represent the views of the public which the ARDS osten-
sibly exists to protect. To prevent the lay person from losing im-
partiality, a procedure could be established to appoint lay people
for relatively short terms and not permit them to serve more than
one term with any board during their lives.
Thus, although the impartiality introduced by a jury into a
criminal trial is needed in attorney discipline, it is unclear
whether a jury would be the best means to that end. Alternatives
to the standard jury may be more effective in serving the purpose.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Assuming that neither the Illinois nor United States Supreme
Court soon will conclude that disciplinary proceedings are crimi-
173. There is always a danger that a jury will fail to follow its instructions properly.
Most jurors have substantial problems understanding complex civil litigation, such as a
patent infringement suit, yet trial by jury is available in such cases.
174. See Note, Constitutional Law - The Right to a Jury Trial in Disbarment
Proceedings, 68 MICH. L. REV. 604 (1970), for a discussion of the advantages of using juries
in attorney discipline.
175. Lobe, A Lay Member's Experience on the Disciplinary Board of the Washington
State Bar Association, 32 BENCH & B. MINN. 10, 10-14 (1975).
19771
358 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:325
nal in nature, the current differences between criminal and at-
torney disciplinary proceedings may persist. However, the
fundamental similarities between the elements, functions, and
structures of the systems suggest that the criminal procedures,
which were developed over a much longer history than were the
Supreme Court Rules for disciplinary action, may be responsive
to needs or failings which characterize the relatively new ARDS.
Adopting the criminal model would greatly increase the capabil-
ity of the ARDS to attain its purposes of maintaining the
integrity of the bar and of ensuring that responding attorneys
receive fair treatment.
